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Determinants of Interest Spread  
in Pakistan  
M. IDREES KHAWAJA and MUSLEH-UD DIN*  
Interest spread of Pakistan’s banking industry has been on the rise for the last two years. 
The increase in interest spread discourages savings and investments, on the one hand, and 
raises concerns about the effectiveness of the bank-lending channels of monetary policy, on the 
other.  This study examines the determinants of interest spread in Pakistan using panel data of 
29 banks. The results show that the share of interest-insensitive deposits in total bank deposits 
is a key determinant of interest spread, whereas industry concentration has no significant 
impact on interest spread. Furthermore, the ongoing merger wave in the banking industry will 
limit the options for the savers, with adverse implications for the interest spread. We argue that 
to maintain a reasonably competitive environment, merger proposals may be subjected to 
review by an anti-trust authority.   
JEL classification: G21, E43, G34 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest spread—the difference between what a bank earns on its assets and what it 
pays out on its liabilities—has been on an upward course during the last few years, 
reaching as high as 7.14 percent at end of 2007. An increase in the interest spread implies 
that either the depositor or the borrower or both stand to loose. In the context of 
developing economies, the lack of alternate avenues of financial intermediation 
aggravates the adverse impact of increase in spread.1 Interest spread also has implications 
for the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. For example the central bank influences 
the yield on treasury bills (T. bill hereafter) which affects the deposit and lending rates2. 
The change in these rates influences the cost of capital that in turn affects the level of 
consumption and investment in the economy. If the pass-through of the changes in yield 
on T. bill rate to the deposit and lending rates is asymmetric then this changes the spread, 
for better or worse, depending upon the nature of asymmetry. If the increase in spread is  
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1Peria and Mody (2004) argue that the impact of increase in spread could be severe in developing 
countries as the capital markets are relatively less developed and a sizable percentage of agents depends on 
banks for their financial needs. 
2For a comprehensive discussion on channels of monetary policy, see Mishkin (1995). 
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due to lower return to depositors then this discourages savings; alternatively if it is due to 
higher charge on loans, investment decisions are affected. In either case the increase in 
spread has an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of bank lending channel of 
monetary policy and has therefore important implications for the economy3.  
This paper explores the determinants of interest spread in Pakistan focusing in 
particular on supply interest-insensitive deposits to the banks and industry concentration. 
A related issue addressed in the paper is the growing trend towards Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&As) in the banking industry that is driven in part by the recently 
introduced Basel Accord II to which Pakistan is a signatory.4  M&As are likely to limit 
competition in the industry with adverse implications for the interest spread. Section 2 
presents a brief review of the literature on determinants of interest spread. Section 3 
spells out the methodology whereas Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 
examines the case for allowing the anti-trust/competition authority to review proposed 
mergers if the competition stands to reduce below a certain specified threshold level. 
Section 6 concludes the discussion.  
2.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature has explored various 
determinants of interest spread including: (i) market structure of the industry; (ii) bank 
specific factors; (iii) macroeconomic variables; and (iv) financial regulations. The 
industrial organisation literature predicts that an oliogopolistic market structure may 
result in higher spreads [Samuel and Valderrama (2006)]. Drawing on insights from the 
literature on industrial organisation, a number of studies have analysed the role of 
concentration in the determination of interest spread in the banking sector. In particular, 
the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, due to Bain (1951), holds that market 
concentration encourages collusion that in turn enables the firms in the industry to pay 
relatively less on their liabilities and charge more on their assets, thereby increasing the 
spread. This implies that if the banks are free to set their own rates, then given market 
power they will set lending rates at higher levels and deposit rates at lower levels than the 
competitive environment would allow. 
Ho and Saunders (1981) view the bank as ‘a dealer’, a demander of deposit and 
supplier of loans, and argue that bank interest margin depends on four factors including 
the degree of bank management’s risk aversion, market structure of the industry, average 
size of bank transactions, and the variance of interest rates. In addition, the authors 
reckon that a number of imperfections and regulatory restrictions have an impact upon 
spread, and consider the probability of loan defaults and opportunity cost of holding 
mandatory reserves as additional variables that influence the spread.   
3For discussion and empirical evidence regarding the impact of monetary policy on the level of real 
economic activity see Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Romer and Romer (1989) and Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992). Also, Samuel and Valderrama (2006) find that wide bank spreads in Barbados may have contributed to 
low rates of private investment and economic growth. 
4To ensure financial solvency, the Accord requires that capital of a bank be at least 8 percent of its risk-
weighted assets. Accordingly, the State Bank of Pakistan has asked commercial banks to raise their capital 
gradually to the level of Rs 6 billion till the end of 2009. Some of the banks that have less capital than the 
required level and/or are facing difficulties in raising capital through equity injection or reinvestment of profits 
are opting for mergers to bring their capital to the required levels. 
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Banking mergers increase concentration and may increase efficiency as well. 
Therefore mergers carry the potential to speed up or slow-down the transmission of change 
in policy rate to deposit and lending rates thereby affecting spreads. Woodbridge and 
Williams (2003) based on Australian experience argue that mergers are undertaken because 
these increase value, either by way of increase in efficiency or increase in bargaining 
power. The authors recommend that mergers that promote efficiency should be allowed and 
those that further monopoly power should be restricted. While reviewing the merger 
approval process in Australia, Woodbridge and Williams note that the process of informal 
clearance of mergers has led to an unhealthy degree of power in the hands of anti-trust 
regulator which can be used to extract concessions from the firms that wish to merge.  
Berger and Hannan (1989) test the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis for 
United States and find that banks in highly concentrated markets pay 25-100 basis points 
less on money market deposit accounts as compared with banks that operate in markets 
with a lower degree of concentration. However the effect of concentration on long term 
certificate of deposits (CDs) rates are marginal at best. Heggestad and Mingo (1976) 
confirm the existence of a statistically significant relationship between concentration and 
prices in the commercial banking sector of United States. With respect to some specific 
services, the study finds that concentration-performance relationship is curvilinear 
implying that the lesser the initial concentration, the greater is the impact of a given 
increase in concentration on prices. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) implicitly confirm the 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis for United States. The authors find that banks 
in concentrated markets are found slower to raise deposit rates in response to rising 
market interest rates but faster to reduce these in response to declining market rates, 
thereby maintaining higher spreads. Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) examine the hypothesis 
for euro area countries and confirm that the S-C-P hypothesis holds for loan and demand 
deposit rates but not for savings and time deposit rates.5 Hannan and Liang (1993) and 
Bajaras, Steiner, and Salazar (1999), using data for United States and Columbia 
respectively, also suggest that industry concentration may lead to higher spread.  
Prager and Hannan (1998) examine the price effects of US bank mergers that led 
to a substantial increase in local market concentration, and find that over the 1991-94 
period the deposit rates offered in local markets where mergers took place declined 
proportionately more than in markets without mergers. Sapienza (2002) examines the 
effect of banking consolidation on banks credit policies in Italy and reports that in case of 
in-market mergers6 interest rates charged by consolidated banks decrease if the merger 
involves acquisition of banks with small market share, but as the local market share of the 
acquired bank increases the decline is offset by market power. Edwards (1965) examines 
the impact concentration and competition in banking industry of United States. The 
author finds that mergers have a greater negative impact upon performance in less 
concentrated markets and therefore recommends that the regulators should be wary of 
mergers as much as in less concentrated as they are in more concentrated markets. Given 
the evidence on the relationship between mergers and deposit/lending rates, the merger 
proposals need to be carefully examined before giving effect to mergers.   
5The reason why concentration does not influence savings and time deposit rates is attributed to the fact 
that such deposits do not require geographical proximity and this allows the agents to shop outside the local 
market. 
6Mergers amongst firms operating in the same geographical market. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To examine the determinants of interest spread for Pakistan’s banking industry, we 
employ a variant of the model used by Peria and Mody (2004). The original motivation is 
from the dealership model of bank spreads developed by Ho and Saunders (1981), 
extended by Allen (1988) and Angbazo (1997). These models predict that market 
structure of the banking sector, macroeconomic variables, operating costs, regulatory 
costs and the credit risk can affect interest spreads. In addition, we include the share of 
current and savings account deposits in total bank deposits as an explanatory variable. 
These deposits are by and large interest-insensitive and the larger is the share of such 
deposits the less incentive the banks have to offer higher returns on deposits. The use of 
this variable is especially important in Pakistan’s environment where a major chunk of 
the bank deposits7 are held in low yield (current and savings) types.  
Our model is:  
ititit eXy 0 … … … … … … (1) 
Where yit is interest spread defined as the difference between interest earned on average 
assets and interest paid on average liabilities, ),( 0 is a vector of parameters, ite is a 
stochastic error term, and itX is a vector of explanatory variables that includes:   
Industry Variables:  
(i) Concentration 
(ii) Interest-insensitivity of deposits. 
Firm Variables: 
(i) Market share 
(ii) Liquidity 
(iii) Administrative cost 
(iv) Non-performing loans 
(v) Equity. 
Macro Variables: 
(i) Real Output 
(ii) Inflation  
(iii) Real interest rate.  
In accordance with the prediction of structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) 
hypothesis we expect a positive sign on concentration. We hypothesise a positive sign on 
the ratio of interest-insensitive deposits to total deposits. Theoretically, changes in T.bill 
rate are passed on to the deposit and lending rates of the banks. The greater the share of 
interest-insensitive deposits the less compelled a bank would be to pass on the increase in 
T.bill rate to deposits, thereby increasing the interest spread. The remaining variables in 
Equation (1) are control variables.  High liquidity ratio, whether self-imposed or the 
result of regulations, inflicts a cost upon banks as they have to give up the opportunity of  
7As of December 2005, some 81 percent of the deposits were held in Current and Savings accounts. 
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investing these funds in alternate high yielding assets, like loans. Accordingly the 
coefficient is hypothesised to have a positive sign. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of 
banks liquid assets to total assets. If banks intermediation cost (i.e. administrative cost) is 
high, they are likely to offset it by charging their customers higher spread. Non-
performing loan (NPL), which captures credit risk, is expected to have a positive impact 
on the spread. Holding large equity, whether on a voluntary basis or as consequence of a 
regulation, is costly and therefore varies positively with spread. To the extent that the 
market share gets translated into market power, the relationship between market share 
and spread is hypothesised to be positive. However larger banks may reap scale 
economies and transfer some of the benefits to their customers in the shape of lower 
spread. Given the conflicting expectations the ultimate hypothesised sign of market share 
is held ambiguous. 
As interest spreads can be influenced by macroeconomic environment we control 
for real output, inflation, and the policy interest rate (T. bill rate).  Real output growth is 
included to capture the effect of business cycles discussed by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) who argue that borrowers’ creditworthiness is countercyclical in that a slowdown 
in economic activity affects borrowers’ fortunes and hence their creditworthiness. The 
change in creditworthiness would affect the lending rate and hence the spread.  Inflation 
is included because if inflation shocks are not passed on in equal measure to deposit and 
lending rates then this would have an impact on the spread. Finally we include the policy 
rate (T.bill rate) that reflects monetary policy stance; if the changes in policy rate are not 
transmitted symmetrically to the deposit and lending rates then the spread would be 
influenced by the policy rate.  
Interest Spread is measured as the return on average assets minus the cost of 
average funds. Return on average assets is worked out as the total interest income earned 
over average assets. The average assets include average loans and advances plus liquid 
interest earning investments. All averages have been worked out by taking the balances 
held at the beginning and end of the year. Average cost of funds is computed as total 
interest paid by the bank over all borrowed funds (Deposits plus Borrowings). 
Concentration is measured by Hirschmann-Herfindhal index.  
We view deposit accounts other then deposits of fixed maturities as interest 
insensitive. Thus the ones considered interest insensitive are current account, savings 
account and other accounts. The current account does not pay any interest and is thus 
obviously interest insensitive. On the other hand, the deposits in savings account can also 
be treated as interest insensitive mainly because typically such accounts are held by small 
depositors and salaried persons who maintain these accounts to fulfil everyday banking 
needs rather than to earn interest.8 The category ‘other deposit accounts’ constitute a 
negligible percentage of the total deposits and their inclusion on either side is not likely 
to alter the results. We consider these as interest insensitive and hence their supply to 
banks as inelastic. 
Market share of each bank is the bank’s total deposits as percentage of the total 
industry deposits; liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets;  
8It is perhaps for this reason that the banks have been reluctant to raise the rate of interest on savings 
deposits, as has been pointed out in the latest interim monetary policy statement of the State Bank of Pakistan 
[SBP (2008)]. 
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administrative cost is the ratio of bank’s administrative expenses to bank’s total assets; 
non-performing loan (NPL) is the ratio of provisions for bad and doubtful debts to 
earning assets; and equity is the ratio of bank’s equity to total assets. Data on all these 
variables are from ‘Banking Statistics of Pakistan’ published annually by State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP). The data on the three macroeconomic variables, viz., real output growth, 
inflation and monetary policy rate (six-months T. bill rate is used as the policy rate) are 
from annual reports of SBP. 
Panel data of 29 banks (see list in Annex-A) for the period from 1998 to 2005 are 
employed in the study. As of now the commercial banks number 35, however to have 
balanced data we have excluded the banks that were non-existent in 1998. Similarly the 
banks that do not exist today but were operating in 1998 have not been included. The use 
of panel data allows us to identify and measure the effects that are simply not detectable 
in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. Models based on panel data can be 
estimated using either the random effects model or the fixed effects model. The random 
effects model assumes the exogeneity of all the regressors with random individual effects 
while fixed effects model allows for the endogeneity of all the regressors with these 
effects [Baltagi (2001)]. However our interest being only in the aggregate response of the 
spread to different variables, the common effect model best suits our purpose. Therefore 
we have used the common effect model.                                           
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The models are estimated using the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) 
method to account for hetroscedasticity that may be present in view of the large variation 
in size of banks. As argued by White (1980), this method enables researchers to draw 
proper inferences even when hetroscedasticity is not completely eliminated.9 Parameters 
estimates obtained from Equation (1) are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1) 
Dependent Variable: Interest Spread 
Sample Size: 203 Observations, Covering 29 Banks and 7 Years 
Estimation Method: Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS),  
White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance 
Variable  Coefficient   t-statistic 
Concentration  –0.002 –1.14 
Inelasticity 0.17  4.38 
Liquidity 0.03  3.18 
Market Share 0.03  3.37 
Equity  0.009  0.67 
Non-performing Loans 0.02 4.28 
Administrative Cost 0.17 2.04 
GDP Growth –0.55 –6.14 
Inflation –0.08 –1.30 
Interest Rate 0.23 3.90 
R2                                                        0.64 
 
9Given the short time period, the problem of serial correlation is not a cause of concern. 
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We have also checked the robustness of results by dropping the statistically 
insignificant variables. First we estimated the model without the variable ‘equity’ and 
then without both the ‘equity’ and ‘inflation rate’. The results, reported in Annexure-A, 
show that the estimated model is fairly robust to changes in specification.  
The variables of our interest are the share of interest-insensitive deposits in total 
deposits and industry concentration. Interest-insensitive deposits have a positive and 
significant impact on spread whereas concentration does not cause a statistically 
significant influence upon interest spread. We argue that the availability of interest-
insensitive deposits leaves little incentive to the bankers to adopt competitive practices 
and therefore the concentration ratio, which captures the level of competition, fails to 
exercise an influence upon spread. To elaborate, it is important to note that interest-
insensitive deposits constituted as much as 81 percent of the total industry deposits in 
2005 (Table 2). On the other hand, fixed deposits as percentage of total deposits have 
been declining with the decline in interest rate [Fixed Deposits (column 3), T.bill rate, 
(column 5)], thus pointing towards the elastic/interest sensitive nature of fixed deposits. 
The decline in fixed deposits has in turn led to an increase in the composition of interest-
insensitive deposits. With the disintermediation of fixed deposits from the banking 
system, the banks, being left largely with interest-insensitive deposits, were not too 
inclined to pay attractive returns on deposits, hence the rise in spread.10 It is also apparent 
from Table 2 that the composition of deposits in 1998 had a clear tilt towards interest-
insensitive deposits. This tilt continued to aggravate during most of the data span. The 
average interest spread (column 4) increased by 2.14 percent in 2005 owing to a 2.86 
percent increase in interest earned on earning assets but only a 0.72 percent increase in 
the cost of bank funds (that mainly includes interest paid to depositors).  
Table 2 
Deposit Supply Elasticity and Interest Spread (Percent)  
Year 
Inelastic: 
Current + Savings +  Others 
Elastic: 
Fixed Deposits
 
Interest 
Spread  
Six Months
T. Bill Rate
1998 67 33 7.38 11.87 
1999 69 31 7.68 10.10 
2000 71 29 7.82 10.96 
2001 75 25 8.69 7.93 
2002 77 23 6.75 4.32 
2003 85 15 4.84 1.64 
2004 83 17 4.51 3.73 
2005 81 19 6.65 8.25 
Source: Banking Statistics of Pakistan [SBP  (Various Issues)].   
10It is no coincidence that the period (i.e. 2002-04) during which the percentage of fixed deposits was 
very low, real estate prices in Pakistan were on the rise and had skyrocketed by 2004. This indicates that at least 
some part of the fixed deposits withdrawn from the banking system had probably ended up in real estate market. 
This also points towards the lack of alternate depository avenues. 
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The observed negative relationship of interest spread with real output (Table 1), is 
in accordance with the business cycles effect discussed by Barnanke and Gertler (1989). 
As mentioned earlier, according to the authors, during recession the creditworthiness of 
the borrower declines and therefore he can borrow only at a higher interest rate, and this 
raises the spread. Therefore we observe a negative relationship between spread and real 
output. The positive relationship of the spread with liquidity is due the fact that as the 
liquidity increases, the bank’s appetite for deposits decreases therefore the bank pays less 
on deposits thereby raising the spread.  
The commercial banks during the nineties and initial years of the ongoing decade 
were burdened with non-performing loans. The situation was so grave that the 
government had to create a separate corporation to which the non performing loans of the 
banks were transferred to clean the balance sheets of the banks and thereby make these 
viable for privatisation. The non-performing loans had increased the intermediation cost 
of the banks. This got translated into higher spread. Hence the positive relationship of 
interest spread with non-performing loans.  
The positive relation of  the interest spread with administrative cost implies that as 
the profitability of the bank decreases due to increase in non-performing loans or 
administrative cost, the bank recoups the losses by increasing the spread, that is, either 
charging more on loans or paying less to depositors or some combination of the two. 
Finally the positive relationship of the spread with market share implies that higher 
market share gets translated into higher market power thereby enabling the bank to raise 
the spread to the detriment of its customers. Its noteworthy here that we hypothesised an 
ambiguous sign on market share because increase in market share may allow the bank to 
reap scale economies and thereby allow the bank to transfer some of the benefits to its 
customers in the shape of lower spread. The fact that the sign on market share is not 
negative implies that scale economies perspective is not valid in case of Pakistan’s 
banking industry.  
5.  BANK MERGERS 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards Mergers and Acquisitions 
in the banking sector. Austin (2002) argues that poorly conceived or badly executed 
M&As can present risks to the participating banks, the banking system and other 
economic sectors [Austin (2002)].  M&As on the one hand allow the merging banks to 
reap scale economies thereby improving efficiency, on the other hand these tend to lessen 
competition. Given the adverse impact of M&As on competition, merger proposals in 
number of countries are scrutinised and at times even blocked if the degree of 
competition is expected to fall below a certain threshold level due to merger/acquisition. 
We find that concentration ratio in banking industry is close to the conventional threshold 
level of 1000 and any further decrease in competition due to mergers may call for review 
from anti-trust perspective. 
In the United States, mergers and acquisitions, besides being approved by the Fed, 
require approval by another agency that specifically looks into mergers. Additionally, the 
anti-trust division of the department of justice issues advisory reports on competitive 
aspects of all bank mergers and is empowered to bring suit against merger proposal that it 
believes will have significant adverse impact on competition. As of now, the scrutiny and 
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the approval of the banking mergers in Pakistan fall under the sole jurisdiction of the 
State Bank of Pakistan, the regulator of banks. Neither the criteria employed for the 
purpose are easily available, nor an institutional mechanism exists to seek public opinion 
or take into account grievances of the stake holders, especially those of depositors. It is 
worth mentioning here that a proviso of the code Good Transparency Practices for 
Financial Policies by Financial Agencies developed by IMF11 says that 
Financial policies should be communicated to the public in an open manner, 
compatible with confidentiality considerations and the need to preserve 
effectiveness of actions. 
According to Austin (2002) the objective of the review by the anti-trust authorities is   
“a determination of whether, within the identified geographic and product 
markets, the effect of transaction will be to substantially lessen 
competition”. 
Typically, the likely affect of M&As on competition is tested by employing a 
measure of industry concentration. More often the concentration is measured in terms of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI measures industry concentration in 
terms of relative size of the competitors. Adding the squares of market shares of all banks 
in the industry, yields the HHI. The credit market share or deposit market share is used as 
a measure of the market share. The HHI approaches zero when market is served by large 
number of players of equal size and it goes to 10,000 in case of a perfect monopoly. 
Under the merger guidelines published by anti-trust division of United States, an 
industry, other then banking, with post-merger HHI below 1000, is considered un-
concentrated; between 1000 and 1800, as moderately concentrated and above 1800 as 
highly concentrated. In industries, other then banking, a merger generating a raise of 50 
points or more in HHI in a highly concentrated industry raises significant concerns. 
However in banking industry, the US department of Justice allows an increase of 200 
points. In US, the higher than normal threshold concentration levels for banking industry 
are meant to take into account the competitive effect of limited purpose lenders, that are 
alternate to banks, such as credit unions, saving and loans association and other non-
depository institutions. However in Pakistan the competition to banking industry from 
other Depository/Lending institution being non-existent, as emphasised by our finding 
regarding the main determinant of interest spread, one cannot convincingly argue for 
applying a concentration ratio higher than that applicable to other industries. We feel that 
research avenue exists for developing our own threshold concentration level based upon 
specifics of the industry. But for the moment, given the absence of financial 
intermediaries that serve as alternate to banks, we take the general US criteria, that is, 
HHI above 1000 points and raise of 50 points due to merger as the condition that would 
call for review of M&As proposal by anti-trust/competition authority (see Annex-B for 
an illustration of HH Index).  
The actual trend of banking industry’s concentration based on HHI is presented 
below (Table 3).    
11International Monetary Fund, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies: Declaration of Principles, (September 26, 1999), and related Factsheet titled Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies (March 2001). 
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Table 3 
Banking Industry: Concentration 
Year     Concentration* Ratio (HHI) 
1998 1,385 
1999 1,446 
2000 1,403 
2001 1,320 
2002 1,200 
2003 1,112 
2004 1,030 
2005   912 
                                        * Based on market share of deposits.  
Though the industry concentration had been on a declining course (Table 3) but it 
is still close to the threshold level that should invite review from antitrust perspective. A 
merger or two can push the concentration above the threshold level of 1000.  Whatever 
the concentration level it is useful to examine the cause of decline in concentration. This 
cause is apparent from a look at the trend of market share composition, presented below 
in Table 4.           
Table 4 
Deposit Market Share  
Five Major 
Domestic Banks 
Banks Established in Private 
Sector since 1991 
1998 74.4 10.6 
1999 76.9 10.4 
2000 75.1 11.9 
2001 72.2 14.8 
2002 68.9 17.7 
2003 66.2 20.7 
2004 62.4 24.4 
2005 57.8 29.0 
Source: Worked out from Banking Statistics in Pakistan [SBP (Various Issues)].  
It is clear from Table 4 that the five major banks, that have been in the market for a 
long time and were protected from competition due to restricted entry till 1991, have lost 
a significant part of their market share to private banks with opening up of the banking 
industry to the private sector. (The share of foreign banks, not shown in the table, has not 
seen a significant shift).    
Using an actual case from Pakistan’s banking industry, as an illustration, we make 
the point that taking into account pre- and post-concentration ratios is important while 
approving bank mergers. In year 2001 United Bank Limited (UBL), then a nationalised 
bank, was put up for sale under the privatisation programme. Muslim Commercial Bank 
(MCB) that had already been privatised by then, made a bid for UBL and its bid being the 
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highest, the sale was initially approved but was later withdrawn given concerns raised in 
the print and electronic Media. Based on the market share enjoyed by the two banks, we 
present below what the pre and post merger concentration ratios (HHIs) would have been, 
had the proposed acquisition gone through.   
The figures given in Table 5 indicate that had the proposed acquisition 
materialised, the industry concentration, measured by HHI would have gone up 219 
points which is much more than the 50 points criteria argued earlier. The second 
condition of the criteria is that the post merger concentration ratio should be more than 
1000 points. The table shows that this condition is also fulfilled. Thus given our criteria 
the proposed acquisition of UBL by MCB should have attracted review by anti-
trust/competition authority and the merger should not have been allowed had the sponsors 
failed to satisfy the authority that there are socially beneficial factors that would offset the 
adverse impact of reduced competition. This is the practice in countries where the 
mergers fall under the jurisdiction of anti-trust authority.  
Table 5 
Banking Industry Concentration HHI:  Pre- and Post-proposed 
Acquisition of  UBL by MCB in 2001  
Deposits 
(Rs in Bill.) 
Market Share 
(Deposit) 
(%) 
Contribution 
to HHI 
(Square: Col. 3) 
Pre-merger    
    MCB 155 10.93 120 
    UBL 141 9.94 99 
    All Banks 1,418   
    MCB and UBL   219 
    HHI (Industry)   1320* 
Post-merger    
    MCB-UBL (Merged) 296 20.87 436 
    All Banks 1418   
    HHI (Industry)   1539** 
Increase in Industry 
Concentration due to 
Merger   219 
   *Shown in Table 3. 
**Worked out separately taking into account deposit market share of 29 banks (list at Annex C).   
Once it is agreed upon that bank mergers need to be subjected to review from anti-
trust perspective the issue arises that which agency should conduct the review; the regulator 
(central bank) or some anti-trust/competition authority. Austin (2002) argues that 
regulator’s interest in preserving the stability of the banking system leans towards greater 
concentration while public’s objective of maximising its return calls for a competitive 
banking industry. As central bank is a party to the conflict, it is not appropriate for it to 
conduct review from anti-trust perspective. However, the central bank is still the most 
suitable authority for looking into mergers from other perspectives like financial soundness. 
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The middle ground then is that the central bank should accord merger approval while at the 
same time the anti-trust authority should have the power to block mergers if these carry the 
potential to reduce competition below a certain specified degree.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated the determinants of interest spread of the banking industry 
in Pakistan, and has explored whether there exists a case for bringing banking mergers and 
acquisitions under the purview of anti-trust authority. Given the specific features of banking 
industry in Pakistan such as the non-existence of financial intermediaries that can serve as an 
alternative to banks for small savers, we included interest-insensitivity of deposit supply to 
banks as a determinant of interest spread. The results show that interest-insensitivity of deposit 
supply has a positive and significant impact on spread whereas concentration does not cause a 
statistically significant influence upon interest spread. We argue that the very high level of 
interest-insensitive deposits leaves little incentive to the bankers to adopt competitive practices 
and therefore the concentration ratio, which captures the level of competition, fails to exercise 
an influence upon spread. We feel that the emergence of alternate financial intermediaries is 
essential for lowering the spread. Meanwhile, the regulator can perhaps play some role in 
lowering the spread. 
Secondly, the study has explored the question of whether or not the on going 
M&As in Pakistan’s banking industry should fall under the jurisdiction of anti-trust 
authority. Given that current level of industry concentration is close to the threshold level 
found in literature for initiating such review, we feel that there is a case for bringing 
M&As under anti-trust review with the anti-trust authority having the power to block 
M&As if these are considered inimical to public interest.   
ANNEXURE-A  
Table A-(1) 
Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1): (Excluding Equity) 
Dependent Variable: Interest Spread 
Sample Size: 203 Observations, Covering 29 Banks and 7 Years  
Estimation Method: Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) White 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Concentration –0.001 –1.21 
Inelasticity 0.17 4.5 
Liquidity 0.03 3.40 
Market Share 0.02 2.22 
Non-performing Loans 0.03 4.65 
Administrative Cost 0.17 2.15 
GDP Growth –0.57 –6.51 
Inflation –0.08 –1.35 
Interest Rate 0.23 3.90 
R2                                                  0.66 
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Table A-(2) 
Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1): (Excluding Equity and CPI) 
Dependent Variable: Interest Spread 
Sample Size: 203 Observations, Covering 29 Banks and 7 Years  
Estimation Method: Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) White 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Concentration –0.002 –1.24 
Inelasticity 0.16 4.01 
Liquidity 0.03 3.60 
Market Share 0.02 2.27 
Non-performing Loans 0.02 4.63 
Administrative Cost 0.17 2.14 
GDP Growth –0.65 –13.40 
Interest Rate 0.17 3.57 
R2                                                 0.66 
 
ANNEXURE-B  
The computation of Herschman-Herfindhal (HHI) index is described below.  
Assume that the six banks indicated in the table below constitute the banking 
industry. Each of the four of the banks in the industry enjoy 20 percent share of the 
market. The two other banks are relative smaller with 10 percent share each of the 
market. We show below what happens to the HHI in case of merger of two large banks, 
A & B (with share of 20 percent each), a large bank and a small one, D & F (with share 
of 20 percent and 10 percent respectively) and two small banks E & F ( with market share 
of 10 percent each). It is evident from the table that merger between two large banks is 
potentially more harmful from competitive market perspective, as it increases 
concentration by 800 points while merger between two small banks causes an increment 
of 200 hundred points in concentration.  
Concentration Ratio 
Post-merger Scenarios: Banks  
Market Share 
(%) 
Pre-merger 
HHI 
A&B 
HHI 
D&E 
HHI 
E&F 
HHI 
A 20 400 – 400 400 
B 20 400 1600 400 400 
C 20 400 400 400 400 
D 20 400 400 900 400 
E 10 100 100 – 400 
F 10 100 100 100  
HHI  1800 2600 2200 2000 
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ANNEXURE-C 
Banks Included in the Sample 
1 Allied Bank of Pakistan 
2 Askari Bank Limited 
3 Al-Habib Bank Limited 
4 My Bank Limited 
5 First Woman Bank 
6 Habib Bank Limited 
7 Alfalah Bank Limited 
8 Metropolitan Bank Limited 
9 Muslim Commercial Bank 
10 National Bank of Pakistan 
11 Prime Bank Limited 
12 Soneri Bank Limited 
13 Union Bank Limited 
14 United Bank Limited 
15 Faysal Bank Limited 
16 Bank of Punjab 
17 Khyber Bank Limited 
18 PICIC Commercial Bank 
19 AL-Baraka Limited  
20 ABN Amro 
21 American Express Bank 
22 Oman Bank Limited 
23 Tokyo Bank  
24 Citi Bank 
25 Deutsche Bank 
26 Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
27 Hong-Shinghai Bank 
28 Rupali Bank 
29 Standard Chartered Bank 
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